Abstract. In this paper we present an account of practical rationality and weakness of will in terms of rational capacities. We show how our account rectifies various shortcomings in Michael Smith's related theory. In particular, our account is capable of accommodating cases of weak-willed behaviour that are not akratic, or otherwise contrary to the agent's better judgment. Our account differs from Smith's primarily by incorporating resolve: a third rational capacity for resolute maintenance of one's intentions. We discuss further two ways to explain the importance of resolve to practical rationality: one based on Richard Holton's recent work, and an alternative, non-consequentialist account.
Introduction
There are a variety of reasons why individuals fail to act in accordance with reason; that is, why they fail to act as they ought to act. Our evaluative response to such failures varies greatly depending upon what we believe to be the circumstances of those failures. An agent can fail to do what she has most reason to do because she fails to judge correctly what she ought to do, and then acts on that erroneous judgment. Alternatively, an agent may make an appropriate judgment as to what she ought to do, but nonetheless fail to act on that judgment. These observations suggest an initial, very coarse-grained, division of ways in which an agent can fail to act as she ought: by a failure of judgment and by a failure to act on one's better judgment.
In order to conform with the dictates of reason, then, at least two things need to a mistake, because C1 is false. 4 Suppose I practice for many years, such that I acquire the capacity to recite pi to 167 decimal places. On the day of a big tournament, however, in which I am hoping to manifest this capacity to win a prize, my benefactor worries that I might fail, and implants a device in my brain that will allow the benefactor to manipulate my vocal chords at his behest. When I am asked to recite the digits, I am in appropriate circumstances and I do indeed recite pi to the correct number of digits: but this is not because of my efforts. My efforts to recite pi are pre-empted by the benefactor's remote control of my vocal chords. He causes me to recite the correct numbers, but this is not a manifestation of my capacity.
C1, therefore, is false. Whatever the correct analysis of manifesting a capacity is, it will presumably make some reference to the causal process by which the outcome comes about. It must be caused, in the right way, by the capacity of the agent, to be a genuine manifestation of that capacity.
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Returning to Rosemary, then, simply because she is now intending to act in accordance with her better judgment does not entail that she is manifesting the capacity to form an intention to act in accordance with her better judgment.
Because she is primarily motivated by her fear of pain, it seems that she is coming to form her intention in the wrong way. Just as, in the tournament, I am reciting pi to the 167th place in the wrong fashion for it to be a manifestation of my capacities, Rosemary is forming an intention in accordance with her better judgment in the wrong fashion for it to be a manifestation of the relevant capacity to form such intentions.
What would it take to form an intention in the right fashion for it to be a manifestation of the capacity for decision? We suggest a necessary condition of it being a manifestation of that capacity is that the formation of the intention be causally dependent upon the agent's having the judgment. This condition will not be sufficient, because there will no doubt be puzzle cases where an intention 4 For related discussion of what it is to have a capacity, see Smith 2003: 21-9. 5 The idea that the manifestation of a disposition requires that the manifestation event come about by a particular type of process is briefly mentioned by Molnar (2003: 91) and developed at greater length by Handfield (forthcoming). Fischer and Ravizza also suggest a similar requirement for the proper manifestation of a reasons-responsive mechanism (1998: 63-4). causally depends upon a judgment in a non-standard, deviant fashion. But, at a minimum, we can expect that there must be causal dependence for the capacity to be manifest and, in Rosemary's case, it is plausible that this causal dependence is lacking. Because she is motivated by fear, it is causally irrelevant what her better judgment is at the time when she abandons her intention to have the abortion. Rosemary, therefore, is not manifesting her capacity for decision.
Rational capacities and responding to reasons
An agent might fail to exercise one of Smith's rational capacities -either the capacity for judgment or the capacity for decision. But does it follow that the agent is therefore irrational? Couldn't it be the case that an agent has other psychological mechanisms by which she responds to reasons? Provided she is still responding to reasons, we might be uncomfortable saying that the agent is irrational.
Nomy Arpaly's (2000: 504-5) well-known case of Emily supports this train of thought. Emily judges, incorrectly, that she ought to remain in graduate school.
But eventually she quits, in spite of her judgment, due to feelings of sadness and restlessness. Emily appears to fail in the exercise of her capacities both for judgment and decision. Nevertheless, Arpaly argues, Emily is rational because (a) her effective intentions are consistent with the judgment that she would have formed had she successfully exercised her capacity for judgment, and (b) her emotions are a reliable guide to the judgment that she would have formed if her judging had been successful.
Perhaps this puts pressure on our claim that Rosemary is practically irrational.
What if her fear is subconsciously caused by her judgment that she ought not to have the abortion? In that case, her fear is helping her to respond to reasons.
We are sympathetic to the thought that it is possible to be rational, employing psychological mechanisms other than Smith's rational capacities -such as emotions. More broadly, we are tempted by non-intellectualist models of practical rationality: models which take it to be an empirical matter whether or not rationality requires us to act on our all-things-considered judgment. 6 However, significant controversy remains over the implications of such a view, and whether we can coherently conceive as ourselves as rational agents, while also blithely acting in response to emotions which we judge to be irrational (Jones 2003: 193-8) . Consequently, we will remain uncommitted on these potentially controversial variations of Rosemary's case. For our purposes, we can focus on cases where the contrary inclinations to which agents are subject are, ex hypothesi, not reason-tracking. Accordingly, we will continue to speakas Smith appears to 7 -as though it is necessary to exercise the rational capacities in order to be practically rational. This can be regarded as a helpful idealisation which highlights what is necessary for practical rationality, in the absence of other reason-tracking mechanisms.
A third rational capacity
So, even though Rosemary decides to do what she judges is best, we think she is not manifesting her capacity for decision -which we described as the capacity to form the intention to do what one judges best. That said, we might be uncomfortable saying that she has failed to manifest that capacity -at least on this occasion. This seems like a strange thing to say because she does not seem to be in the right circumstances. Certainly there is room for argument over how to delimit the circumstances of the capacity for decision, but one way to interpret it is as a capacity to form an intention in circumstances where one is currently undecided what to do. Rosemary, however, has already formed an intention. What she is doing now is revising her intention. And Smith's second rational capacity -on at least one plausible construal -is a capacity to form an intention in circumstances of indecision -not a capacity to revise intentions after a decision has been made.
Not only does it seem pragmatically odd to say that Rosemary has "failed" to exercise her capacity for decision (because we might think that the 6 See, e.g. Jones 2003: 187-8 for a discussion of the key commitments of a non-intellectualist approach to practical rationality. circumstances for decision have long since passed), there is a more pressing reason why we should resist the thought that Rosemary's failing is a failure to exercise her second capacity. That is: her rational failing is different in kind from the failing she first manifested, when she decided she would have the abortion. At that time, she had a justified belief about what she ought to do, and she nonetheless formed the intention to do otherwise. Her failure of practical rationality was somehow grounded in this failure to match her judgment and her will. At this later time, however, her judgment is far less salient in explaining her rational failing. Rather, what seems salient now is that she has formed a specific intention to go through with an unpleasant action. She was in a position to know that the action would be unpleasant and difficult to go through with, but she nonetheless resolved to do it. Yet, despite that resolution, she failed to bring her action into accordance with it. This, we suggest, is the crucial failing that she manifests at the later time.
We suggest that, to analyse correctly what is happening here, we need to postulate a third capacity involved in rational agency: a capacity to maintain one's resolve, in circumstances where one has already decided what to do. It is this capacity which Rosemary is failing to exercise, and is therefore responsible for her weakness of will.
The capacities required for practical rationality then -for strong-willed action in particular -can be glossed as follows 8 to do this, I seem to suffer from a form of weakness of will that might be described as inconstancy of my will. Below, when we discuss the mechanism by which resolve operates, we note a further complication in trying to separate decision and resolve.
Inconstancy is the form of weakness from which Rosemary is suffering when she leaves the clinic. She is unable to maintain her initial intention. What makes Rosemary's case especially unusual is that she has manifested two different species of weakness of will, and on two separate occasions. First, she failed to manifest the second capacity, and formed the intention to do something other than what she thought was best. This is a traditional case of weakness-asakrasia. Secondly, however, she failed to maintain that intention, because she was not able to maintain it in anticipation of pain and discomfort. So the two occasions of weakness effectively cancelled each other out, and she ended up intending to do precisely that which she had originally judged to be best. But because she came to this intention in the wrong way, it was not a manifestation of either her second or third capacities.
As we have seen, Smith could -by appealing to our causal requirement for the manifestation of a capacity, and at the cost of some pragmatic awkwardnesslocate a certain form of irrationality in Rosemary on this later occasion: she is irrational because she fails, for a second time, to exercise her capacity for decision, because her judgment is not causing her intention in the right way.
The preceding discussion should make clear that this is not enough to make good sense of the case. Rosemary manifests two distinct forms of practical irrationality. Not only is she irrational in forming an intention contrary to her better judgment. She is irrational, again, when she fails to maintain this (irrationally formed) intention, failing to exercise her capacity for resolve. It is for this reason, ultimately, that Smith's two-capacity model fails to offer a satisfactory moral psychology.
The irrationality of changing one's mind
The third rational capacity, suggested above, is very similar to an ability or tendency which Richard Holton (1999 Holton ( , 2003 Holton ( , 2004 has identified as crucial for a reckless judgment, and thus avoid the need for a third rational capacity. Perhaps I have irrationally judged that I ought, all things considered, to reconsider my order. The better judgment would have been that I ought not to reconsider. While we admire the ingenuity of the thought, we have trouble believing it is a serious alternative. It clearly invites a dangerous regress of judgments: ought I to be reconsidering whether or not to reconsider? Ought I to be considering that question? And even if this regress could be stopped, we fear that there may be cases of incommensurable choices that produce either paralysis or sub-optimal results if we allow reconsideration of any sort. See n. 27 below.
avoiding weakness of will: the tendency to resist reconsidering our intentions, or simply will-power. For Holton, the central paradigm of strength of will does not involve actively reconsidering and weighing one's current temptations against an earlier decision. Rather, it involves resisting -or downright avoiding -the very process of reconsideration. So Holton claims that the mechanism by which the capacity of resolve operates is -at least in central cases -simply a capacity to resist reconsideration.
We agree with Holton that this is a very promising account of the mechanism by which resolve works. Apart from its empirical plausibility, it has the benefit of showing how the fact that we have resolved to do something can appear to furnish us with extra reason to do that thing, while avoiding the objection that this would allow us to bootstrap ourselves into justifications for arbitrary actions (Holton 2004: 514-6) .
Having endorsed Holton's understanding of the mechanism, however, requires us to revisit the characterisation of the rational capacities. Our earlier characterisation suggested that resolve operates solely to aid the person who
has already decided what to do. But sometimes, where the reasons are finely balanced for and against an action, it might be necessary to halt reconsideration and simply plump for one option or the other. Consider someone who appears to be incapable of forming an intention to act, because of ceaseless dithering and reconsideration of the relevant reasons. It seems that a person like this is manifesting much the same defect as a person who forms an intention but abandons it too readily, due to an excessive habit of reconsideration. It is seemingly a more grave defect in the latter case; but a crucial causal factor in both cases is a habit of engaging in more deliberation than is healthy.
So our initial characterisation of resolve, as a capacity to maintain one's intention, is incorrect. Rather, resolve is probably better understood as a capacity to cease or suppress deliberation -regardless of whether or not an intention has been formed. Sometimes we need to manifest this capacity in order to form an intention. 12 Sometimes we need to manifest it in order to maintain our 12 We note that it is not entirely natural sounding to describe an agent as being resolute when they are first forming an intention -but we think that the introduction of this tension with natural language is required to give an elegant account of the psychology.
intentions.
This might lead the reader to wonder: if we need to manifest resolve even where we are undecided, what role is left for the capacity of decision? Wasn't decision the capacity to form an intention? Our claim, however, is just that being resolute is sometimes a causally necessary condition for the formation of an intention. That does not show that resolve is itself the capacity for decision.
(Compare: the cook's exercising her capacity to not get distracted by her emails may be a causally necessary step in preparing a delicious meal; but that does not show that the capacity to prepare a delicious meal is identical to the former capacity.) The picture we are suggesting here is that we have one capacity, judgement, which enables us to form judgments that track the available reasons.
Decision is a capacity which enables us to form intentions that track the available reasons. 13 And resolve is a capacity that puts the brakes on deliberation. This hinders the exercise of our judgment -we may be become temporarily blinded to some of the reasons at the level of reflective thought. But in so doing, we improve our situation by ensuring that our intentions are more stable. 14 The stability of intentions can in turn serve to ensure that our actions better track the available reasons. The vacillating restaurant patron might have impeccable judgment, but as a practical agent is a rational failure.
This book-keeping done, we need to turn to the rational status of resolve. As
Holton rightly points out: it is sometimes rational to reconsider one's earlier intentions; and sometimes it is rational to change one's mind. The rational capacity to resist reconsideration is surely not the capacity to doggedly stick to one's intentions in any circumstance. So we need to specify the scope of the capacity; we need to say why and when it makes sense to reconsider and change one's mind.
In order to specify the scope of the capacity for resolve, as it ought to function, we need an account of the underlying rationale of the capacity. Why, that is, do 13 See Holton 2006 for an instructive discussion of the way in which this capacity might need to operate somewhat independently of the capacity for judgment: it might be that we do our best reason-tracking when we form intentions without any judgment.
14 See Holton 2003 for a detailed attempt to describe how the stability of intentions may be undermined by deliberation.
rational agents need such a capacity? Drawing on Michael Bratman's (1987: 64) "two tier" justification of intentions, Holton defends the capacity for resolve by appealing to certain substantive benefits that the capacity might promote.
According to Bratman, whether it is rational for an agent to maintain an intention or, rather, to abandon it is determined by whether it is beneficial for the agent to possess the propensity to maintain or abandon intentions in the circumstances. We implicitly endorsed this view, earlier on, in the case of the fickle restaurant patron. Revising one's intended order seems irrational precisely because having the disposition to reconsider seems harmful. To mention just one consideration (emphasised on Bratman's account), such a disposition would be disadvantageous because it would likely hinder both intra-and inter-personal coordination.
But of course, neither we nor Holton want to suggest that reconsideration, and subsequent revision, of one's intentions is always irrational. There are three crucial aspects of Holton's view which serve to block the implication that changing one's mind is always irrational.
First, some intentions contain their own let-out clauses (Holton 1999: 250) .
Intentions arising from appetites seem to be excellent examples of this: we intend to drink some water, provided we are still thirsty by the time we reach the tap. So revising one's intention once such a let-out clause is triggered is surely not a failure of one's rational capacities.
Second, Holton is especially concerned with a special sub-class of intentions that are designed to overcome contrary inclinations in future. Call these resolutions. Reconsidering our resolutions, leading to abandonment of the intention, is paradigmatic of weakness of will. Revising ordinary intentions (such as my order at the restaurant) may also be unreasonable, but is merely capricious, rather than weak-willed. Holton suggests, then, that there is a genus of unreasonable behaviour -irresoluteness -and that caprice and weakness of will are its two species (Holton 1999: 250-1) .
See also McIntyre (2006: 297) , who claims that a failure to be resolute can never take us completely by surprise, because resolution always involves anticipation of contrary inclinations. We are not entirely convinced on this point. We think it possible that agents can sometimes be weak-willed because they should have anticipated contrary inclinations, and failed to make an appropriate resolution. But we do The act of reconsidering, or maintaining, a resolution is rational, for Holton, if it is a manifestation of a tendency which it is rational to have, by the above conditions. (Though it should be noted that Holton puts forward these conditions only provisionally, and as likely to be incomplete.)
As Holton realises, the various conditions in which it might be rational to have a tendency either to reconsider or resist reconsidering, are not mutually exclusive. He writes:
The obvious difficulty comes in the tension between the two sets of conditions. Cases of judgment shift will be cases where the first two rules not pursue this difference of opinion here.
will recommend non-reconsideration, but where the agent will believe, if Much of what Holton says here seems right. It is true that we would recommend that agents acquire specific habits of reconsideration and nonreconsideration, customised for the particular sorts of intention involved, and for the peculiar psychology of the agent. 16 However, Holton seems not to have grasped the full implications of his view here. It follows straightforwardly from a set of conditions like Holton's suggested ones that there will be circumstances in which the triggering conditions for two opposing tendencies are met.
For example, Rosemary is likely to be less reliable in any judgment she forms on the doorstep of the clinic than in the comfort of her own home. So she is -very likely -in circumstances where it is beneficial to have a tendency to resist reconsidering. However, it might also be argued that she has acquired new information: she has learned that she fears pain more than she realised. It is beneficial to have a tendency to reconsider when one acquires new information.
So if Rosemary acts on the tendency to reconsider in light of new information, she will be acting on a beneficial tendency, and thereby be acting rationally. On
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Though this point requires some qualification, as will become evident below.
the other hand, if Rosemary manifests a resistance to reconsidering in light of being in worse circumstances for judgment, she will also be acting on a beneficial tendency, and thereby be acting rationally. Rational action is in danger of becoming too easy, on Holton's account.
Rather, in cases like Rosemary's we think practical rationality is extremely hard; it may even be impossible. If she revises her original intention, she seems to be weak-willed. But if she maintains her resolve, she is going to be committed to concluding a plan which is against her better judgment. Depending upon one's views about the nature of practical rationality, this could be a dilemma, whereby she behaves irrationally no matter what she does.
Putting the particular complications and difficulties peculiar to Rosemary's case to one side, the same argument -that rational action is too easy -could apply to anyone on the cusp of undergoing a painful medical procedure. Notice that it will not suffice to remedy this by specifying ever more fine-grained conditions that demarcate when the tendencies in question are beneficial. If we seriously wished to take that path, we may as well eliminate the dispositional aspect of the story altogether, and simply say that an agent acts rationally if what she does benefits her. And that is precisely the conclusion that the two-tier account is designed to circumvent.
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What has gone wrong? In our view, the difficulty here is not merely incidental.
Rather, it reflects a perennial difficulty that afflicts various attempts to give a substantive specification of the nature of the virtues. That is: we suspect that resolve is a virtue 18 -or something very much like it -and by trying to give a
substantive specification of what that virtue consists in, Holton finds himself faced with a particular instance of a general problem that seems to face any virtue theorist.
The general problem is this: Suppose someone asks why a given trait, X, is a 17 This parallels David Lyons' (1965) well-known argument that rule-utilitarianism collapses into actutilitarianism.
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Perhaps another reason to think that resolve is a virtue is that it seems to be called for in different degrees in different roles. Military and political leaders, in particular, seem to require a high degree of resolve. Thanks to the Editor for bringing this point to our attention.
virtue. One sort of answer would be broadly consequentialist. "Agents who have X tend to promote some sort of value, so it is a good trait to have." While that might be a good answer for why we should tend to cultivate X in ourselves or others, it seems to have reduced the virtue claim to a merely consequentialist claim -and that might seem objectionable. In particular, it seems to give rise to various puzzles about right action that the virtue theorist had intended to avoid. "Why, on this occasion, should I manifest X, given that better consequences could be achieved by acting from a different trait, incompatible with X (or by simply suppressing the manifestation of trait X)?" Insistence that I
should manifest X smacks of 'trait-worship', analogous to the allegation of 'rule-worship' that seemingly afflicts rule utilitarians (Smart 1967) .
Entangled with this issue is a question as to how X is specified. If X is given a substantive specification, independent of causal consequences, then it seems to be a contingent matter whether or not X will satisfy the consequentialist rationale for deeming it a virtue. But if we simply specify X as 'that trait which has optimal consequences', then we have made the trait an idle wheel in the explanation of right action. Right action is seemingly explained in straightforwardly act-consequentialist terms.
Returning to the first question -why is X a virtue? -the alternative answer would be resolutely non-consequentialist. In virtue theory, for instance, we might claim that X is a virtue not because of its causal consequences, but because possession of X is partly constitutive of the value we ought to promote.
This style of answer seemingly avoids the question that embarrassed the consequentialist account. But it does so at cost of incurring two liabilities: such an account must (i) make substantive claims about the nature of X, and must also (ii) posit an internal relation between X and the relevant value.
Holton's account of the rationality of resolve is straightforwardly in the consequentialist camp. So even though we might acknowledge that agents generally benefit by being resolute in circumstances of the sort we are in, we can still ask whether it is rational, on this occasion, to be resolute, given that we can bring about better outcomes by reconsidering our resolutions. It is difficult, while remaining consistent with the consequentialist flavour of the original rationale, to maintain that an agent should nonetheless resolutely forgo optimal outcomes, simply because the habit of being resolute in circumstances like this is one that is beneficial. True enough, but perhaps an imperfect habit, or a different habit, could be even more beneficial.
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So one option would be to try to develop an account of resolve which makes it partly constitutive of practical rationality, rather than something which earns a place in the arsenal of a rational agent by virtue of its contingent benefits. 20 To be plausible, however, any such account would have to offer a substantive characterisation of resolve that is not susceptible to the sort of incompleteness that Holton's rules of thumb possess. Moreover, it would need to have some sort of account of the nature of practical rationality which explicated why resolve, so characterised, is a necessary condition of being practically rational.
We are not confident that we can conclusively defend any such account. At best, we think we can illustrate a plausible-sounding view of this second sort.
So, in that spirit, below we sketch a non-consequentialist account of the role of resolve in practical rationality.
A non-consequentialist account of resolve
The two-tier account of resolve mistakenly privileges benefit over the essential requirements of agency. Sometimes, to be an agent, you need certain dispositions, even where those dispositions are not beneficial. It costs something to be an agent, and this cost is non-negotiable. Resolution is one of the dispositions required for agency. The reason for this is to do with the essentially temporally extended nature of our agency. We are the sorts of creatures who are typically subject to highly variable temptations over time.
Our processes of reasoning and judging cannot take effect instantaneously, and are frequently much less salient than those temptations, once we are in the 19 Bratman's account of the stability of intentions is similarly consequentialist. When discussing the sort of problem we are posing here, he suggests a restriction on the two-tier rationale, such that if it is obvious to a reflective agent that it is worth reconsidering, then to do so is rational -even if that breaks a habit that is otherwise beneficial (1992: 10). This saves the agent from being required to consciously and obviously engage in habit-worship, but since it seems possible to be involved in non-obvious habitworship, we suspect that he does not entirely avoid the objection.
excessive tendency to engage in deliberation; or in other words, a lack of resolve.
Applying the two-tier account, Holton argues that resolve is rationally required in cases such as these because the tendency to vacillate is pragmatically unreasonable, i.e. detrimental to an agent's interests (1999: 252-3; 2004: 524-5 ).
This might, of course, be plausible in the circumstances: Dostoevsky's hero does not seem to be flourishing! But our thought is that these pragmatic considerations, while important, fail to get to the root of the pertinent defect of practical rationality. Even if the underground man were to suffer no ill-effects from vacillating, we suggest that he is nevertheless suffering from a kind of break-down of agency. He is so inconstant in his behavioural orientation that his processes of reasoning, evaluation, and judgment are no longer causally connected to his acting. Agency requires that our reasons move us to act, so his very agency is being undermined.
Normally, of course, we are dealing with failures of lesser severity. A normal failure of resolve is simply -as in Rosemary's case -a limited instance where a temptation or fear overcomes one's prior intention. Under what circumstances does such a failure constitute practical irrationality? We will try to answer this question more precisely below, but for now we wish to stress that the question is not simply whether it is beneficial for the agent to have a habit of reconsideration or non-reconsideration in the particular type of circumstances at hand. Rather, in every case where we fail to maintain a resolution, other things being equal, something is occurring that is contrary to the habits that constitute practical agency. This is so, even if the agent is manifesting a disposition which it is beneficial for her to have.
There is perhaps some indirect linguistic evidence of resolve's constitutive role in agency. Recall that, on Smith's analysis of rational agency, an agent who is
incapable of judging what is best, or an agent who is incapable of forming the intention to do what is best, is pathologically afflicted. In the first case, we would perhaps say that someone is mentally incompetent (or criminally illness, and I don't know for certain what part of me is affected. I am not having any treatment for it, although I have a great respect for medicine and doctors. I am besides extremely superstitious, if only in having such respect for medicine. (I am well educated enough not to be superstitious, but superstitious I am.)" (Ibid., p. 15).
insane), and in the second we would say that someone is suffering from a pathological compulsion. In both cases, we would excuse the agent of moral responsibility for her actions. But is there such a thing as pathological inconstancy of the will? We do have terms to describe various degrees of inconstancy, such as "fickle" or "capricious", but we do not seem to have a ready category for the person who is relieved of moral responsibility on account of this deficiency. Perhaps this is because any such condition would be so totally disabling as to make complex voluntary actions near-impossible: the agent would suffer a sort of rational paralysis, like that which the underground man seems to describe.
If this sort of link between agency and resolve seems plausible, then we have discharged the second liability mentioned above: we have described the internal link between agency and resolve. But it remains to discharge the first liability: to give a substantive account of what the trait consists in.
Rationally changing one's mind
Note that, in claiming that the exercise of resolve is a constitutive habit of agency, we are not saying that being resolute is a necessary condition of practical rationality in every instance of our behaviour. If the capacity for resolve is akin to a virtue, it is surely possible to be overly resolute, or stubborn. 23 We are merely, in the process of offering a non-consequentialist account of resolve, registering that every instance of irresolute behaviourbehaviour where resolve is called for, but not manifested -is contrary to a habit which is essential to agency, and thus to rationality.
That said, we need to make sure that our non-consequentialist account doesn't recommend obstinately sticking to one's original intention in every case.
Sometimes, obviously, it is rational to change one's mind, and this is not to be settled solely on the basis of whether or not one makes a habit of changing one's mind. Here we agree with Holton that questions of benefit are relevant, but we draw a distinction between benefits for a particular individual and benefits for a typical individual. It is the latter which is crucial for analysing See also Holton 1999: 247-8. weakness, we contend.
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There are three salient types of occasion when one might wish to change one's mind. These are occasions where one's judgments are: (i) temporally variable,
(ii) rationally mandated, or (iii) rationally underdetermined. By invoking a "typical" individual in our account, we intend to remain agnostic between various ways this concept could be analysed. One could endorse an evolutionary-historical sense of the term, whereby the typical individual is one who is exposed to a sort of "average" environment, relative to the various selection pressures that have occurred in the history of the relevant population. Alternatively, one could intend a more obviously normative or teleological sense of the term, whereby the typical individual is characterised by having "proper goals and ends" or manifests certain "normal" properties.
action which the agent has resolved to undertake. This could be due to a Buridan's ass-type situation, or due to incommensurable considerations favouring each of the possible alternatives. 26 The faculty of judgment alone is unable, in such cases, to conclusively determine that any particular course of action is required, and the agent has had to "plump" for one option so as to avoid doing nothing. A would-be jogger might be very confident, for instance, that he should jog at least four days a week, but have no compelling reason to jog on any particular day of the week.
At risk of doing nothing, however, he had better plump for some particular days to jog.
These categories need not be mutually exclusive, and are no doubt somewhat vague. The key point is that it is in cases like (i) and (iii) that we see paradigm instances of weakness if an agent changes her mind. We suggest this is because, for typical creatures like us, the capacity of resolve will -if manifested -tend to deliver benefits in these cases. Changes in temporal perspective are a pervasive feature of human life, and if we were subject to changes of behavioural orientation every time our current reasons changed, we would be crippled from achieving our longer term goals. Resolve prevents this from happening.
Similarly, life often involves cases of rationally underdetermined choice, and resolve is crucial in getting us through such situations without endless reconsideration and dithering. Crucially, the intention he formed to drink alcohol today was not a resolutionthe sort of intention that is designed to defeat contrary inclinations -so we are much less inclined to deem the agent weak-willed. We might, in some circumstances, call the agent capricious or inconstant -the sort of vacillation he is manifesting is a minor variety of practical irrationality. But most plausibly, we believe that cases like this are akin to abandoning an appetite-based intention. The alcoholic intended to buy a drink because, and only for so long as, he very much wanted the drink. If his wanting is diminished in the face of guilt or self-admonition, then there is manifestly less reason to preserve the intention, and there is no irrationality in the change of mind.
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By saying that resolve benefits typical agents in cases of temporally variable and rationally underdetermined judgments, we are not saying that it will be beneficial for all agents to maintain their resolve in such cases. We can surely conceive of an agent that is in a special environment such that she receives freakish benefits for changing her intentions in cases like (i) and (iii). For that agent, then, it is beneficial to have tendencies that lead to change of intentions.
On an account that privileges those dispositions that are beneficial to an 27 Holton is alive to this distinction (1999: 249-250) .
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Thanks to Robert Sparrow for raising this case.
individual, therefore, the agent is not practically irrational. 29 We disagree. The tendency to resist reconsidering in these cases is essential to practical rationality for creatures like us. Therefore, regardless of individual benefit, the agent is irresolute -either capricious or weak-willed, depending upon what sort of intentions are at stake.
Conversely, we can conceive of an agent who has tendencies stubbornly to resist reconsidering in cases of rationally mandated judgment-shift. It is conceivable that these tendencies will prove extremely beneficial. Again, while this is surely not the case for most of us, it could be the case for a fortunate individual. Again, on an account that examines the matter in terms of individuals, these stubborn tendencies are beneficial, and the agent is practically rational. But because this agent is atypical, we suggest that this agent has employed the capacity for resolve outside its proper scope, and has thereby corrupted her practical rationality.
To conclude: Practical rationality involves the manifestation of certain rational capacities. These capacities can be described as: first, a capacity to form justified judgments; second, a capacity to form intentions to do what we judge best; and third, a capacity to resist reconsidering our intentions. For all three of the rational capacities, however, it is crucial, not only that the relevant type of manifestation event occurs, but that it occurs in the right way. In cases like Rosemary's, an agent can end up doing what he or she judges best, but because the process by which that happens is deviant, the agent is not practically rational. Practical rationality, then, is somewhat like knowledge. Rosemary is reminiscent of an agent in a Gettier case. She did the right thing (akin to a true belief), and she had good reasons to believe it was the right thing (akin to a justified belief), but she got there by a "lucky" route. And doing the right thing by luck, it seems, is incompatible with practical rationality.
Bringing out the relationship between luck and practical rationality also highlights the role, in our account, of benefit in justifying the rational capacity for resolution. The capacity to cease or suppress deliberation is rational, not merely because it is frequently beneficial. Rather -we are tempted to argue -it 29 It is not clear how Holton stands on this matter. His crucial discussion of toxin cases (2004: 527-9) remains ambiguous between individual benefit versus other construals, such as ours.
is essential to agency in agents like us. But of course that is compatible with there being unlucky agents who manifest the capacity but fail to derive benefits.
And it is also compatible with there being lucky agents who fail to manifest the capacity but reap atypical dividends.
Acknowledgments
Thanks to Richard Holton, Neil Levy, and the Editor of MIND for helpful comments on earlier drafts. Two anonymous referees for MIND also provided useful advice. The authors also acknowledge the very helpful discussion of this paper with audiences at Charles Sturt University and at Monash University.
Toby Handfield gratefully acknowledges the support of the Australian
Research Council.
